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COMMENT

Behrami v. France: An Unfortunate Step
Backwards in the Protection of Human Rights
SADIA R. SORATHIA*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A young child’s death, caused by a forgotten land mine, brought
world-wide scrutiny to the laws of international responsibility and
attribution.1 In this potentially shining moment for the European
Court of Human Rights (Court) to establish itself as the premier
champion of human rights, the Court floundered; casted, instead, as a
weak judicial body, incapable of standing up to the powerful nations
party to the European Convention.2 The Court failed to apply
generally accepted international law when it conflated two leading
principles: attribution and delegation.3 In creating a test that
illogically held the United Nations (UN) responsible, the Court
reshaped human rights protection in an unfortunate way.4 This
adoption of an unfounded test has deterred the advancement of
international human rights law, hindered the Court’s capacity to
provide remedies to individuals suffering from human rights
violations, and threatened the Court’s reputation in human rights
protection.5

* Managing Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2010-2011; J.D.,
University of Maryland School of Law, May 2011.
1. See infra Part V.F.1.
2. See infra Part V.F.1.
3. See infra Part V.C.
4. See infra Part V.D.
5. See infra Part V.F.2.
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II. THE CASE
A. Historical Background
In 1998, the Kosovo independence movement took a bloody turn
when the clash between Serbian and Yugoslav security forces and
ethnic Albanian rebels erupted into armed conflict.6 The Serbian
military’s refusal to end the conflict at the request of the international
community forced the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to
commence air strikes on the territory then known as the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).7 The military tactics NATO
employed partly consisted of dropping cluster bomb units (CBUs) on
Kosovo territory.8 After three months of NATO air strikes, Serbian
troops agreed to withdraw from Kosovo.9
Shortly thereafter, United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 1244 required the withdrawal of Serbian troops from
Kosovo and established a dual international presence, consisting of
both a civil administration, run by the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK), and a NATO led military presence (KFOR).10
NATO divided KFOR into four multinational brigades (MNBs), each
responsible for ensuring the security of a specific region of Kosovo.11
Each MNB was commanded by a different ―lead country.‖12

6. Avnita Lakhani, Finding a Peaceful Path for Kosovo: A Track Two
Approach, 7 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 27, 30 (2006). During the 1990s,
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo struggled for independence. Serbia acted as the
unofficial Kosovo government and Serbian troops carried out repressive measures
in order to suppress the ethnic Albanians’ movement for international recognition
of an independent Kosovo state. Id. at 28. The Serbian attempt to quash the
independence movement led to the Kosovo Liberation Army insurgency. Id. at 30.
As a result, the Kosovo Liberation Army gained temporary control of territories
within Kosovo. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic sent Serbian troops to
reclaim these territories. Id. This counterinsurgency led to a large-scale massacre
and expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Id.
7. Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 747 (2007).
8. Id. at 748.
9. Id. at 747. Air strikes occurred from March 1999 to June 1999. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.

SADIA

12/3/2011 11:18 PM

2011]

BEHRAMI V. FRANCE

273

B. Facts
On March 11, 2000, eight young boys were playing in a field
near their homes in the Mitrovica region of Kosovo.13 As the boys
were playing, they came upon an undetonated CBU, dropped by
NATO in 1999.14 One of the boys, thinking the CBU was a toy, threw
it in the air, causing its detonation.15 The explosion killed twelve year
old Gadaf Behrami and severely injured and permanently disfigured
his ten year old brother, Bekim Behrami.16
France led the MNB Northeast, which included Mitrovica.17
Following the incident, UNMIK released an investigation report,
stating that KFOR French officers knew of the undetonated CBUs
months prior to the accident, and consciously labeled the undetonated
CBUs as ―not a high priority.‖18 UNMIK concluded that the death
was an ―unintentional homicide committed by imprudence.‖19
Agim Behrami, the father of Gadaf and Bekim, petitioned to the
European Court of Human Rights, complaining France violated
Article 220 of the European Convention on Human Rights.21 Behrami
alleged that the incident occurred because French-led KFOR troops
deliberately failed to defuse or mark the undetonated CBUs, despite
knowing of their existence.22 Behrami argued that France, and not the
UN or NATO, was responsible for the failure to demine because
13. Id.
14. Id. at 748.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 747–48.
17. Id. at 747.
18. Id. at 748.
19. Id. Gadaf Behrami’s autopsy confirmed that his death was a result of the
multiple injuries he sustained from the CBU explosion. Id.
20. Id. at 759; cf. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, entered
into force June 1, 2010, E.T.S. No. 5, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm [hereinafter Convention] (Article 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights: ―Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by
law.‖).
21. Behrami, 46 I.L.M. at 759. On October 25, 2001, Agim Behrami argued to
the Kosovo claims office that France violated UNSC Resolution 1244. Id. at 748.
Kosovo rejected the allegation and Behrami then filed a complaint with the
European Court of Human Rights. Id. at 748, 759.
22. Id. at 759. Behrami cannot allege that KFOR is responsible for failing to
defuse CBUs because KFOR does not have a separate legal personality and cannot
bear responsibility for the acts or omissions of its personnel. Id. at 762.

SADIA

274

12/3/2011 11:18 PM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 26:271

France had ―effective control‖ of the region.23 ―Effective control‖
stemmed from the fact that France was the lead country where the
accident occurred,24 in addition to possessing command responsibility
for the KFOR troops directly responsible for the demining operation
in Mitrovica.25
France filed its rebuttal with the Court, arguing that KFOR was
an international structure established by and answerable to the UN
and not France.26 The rebuttal asserted that the UN, and not France,
had effective control of the region.27 France further alleged that
Behrami’s claim was not within the jurisdiction of Article 1 28 of the
Court because the incident in question did not occur within French
territory.29
The UN intervened and argued that it did not play a role in the
daily operations of KFOR because daily oversight of KFOR actions
was delegated to NATO and the contributing States.30 The UN
further argued that while the mandate to demine fell within UNMIK’s
duties, KFOR collected and distributed to UNMIK the CBU
information.31 The UN alleged that KFOR failed to present UNMIK
with information about CBUs in the Mitrovica region; therefore, the
failure to demine could not be attributed to the UN because

23. Id. at 761, 763.
24. Id. at 761.
25. Id. at 762. KFOR troops were directly answerable to their national
commander; therefore, KFOR troops in Mitrovica took orders from their French
commander. Id.
26. Id. at 768.
27. Id. at 760. Numerous states not associated with the litigation, such as
Germany and the United Kingdom, submitted third party reports, arguing that the
Court, under Article 1 of the European Court of Human Rights, did not have
jurisdiction to hold France liable for the incident in question. Id. at 764–67.
28. Id. at 760. Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights says that
―the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.‖ Convention, supra
note 20, art. 1.
29. Behrami, 46 I.L.M at 760. According to France, the chain of command went
from KFOR, to NATO, to UNSC. Id. at 763. France further argues that it based its
actions on directives from NATO. Id.
30. See id. at 760, 767–68.
31. Id. at 760. Even though UNMIK assumed de facto control of demining
operations months before the accident in question, UNMIK’s de facto control did
not relieve KFOR of its responsibility to engage in demining activities, such as
marking and reporting the location of CBUs. Id. at 768.
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UNMIK’s actions to demine are dependent upon KFOR’s distribution
of accurate information.32
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Framework of the Mission
In order to determine whether an international organization or a
member-state bears the responsibility of a peacekeeping and security
mission, one must first analyze the framework of the international
resolutions that mandated the efforts in Kosovo, focusing on the
extent of power and control granted to the participating international
organizations and its member-states.
On June 9, 1999, KFOR, the Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia signed a Military
Technical Agreement (MTA).33 Article 1, section 1 of the agreement
discusses deployment of international troops to Kosovo. Specifically,
it provides for ―effective international civil and security presences‖
under UN auspices.34 Section 2 of article 1 asserts that an
international security force (KFOR) will operate in Kosovo without
hindrance and with the ―authority to take all necessary action to
establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of
Kosovo.‖35
The next day, on June 10, 1999, the MTA was presented to the
UNSC, which led to the signing of UNSC Resolution 1244. The
Resolution ―decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United
Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences.‖36 The
32. Id. at 760, 768.
33. Military Technical Agreement Between the Int’l Security Force (―KFOR‖)
and the Gov’ts of the Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serb., June
9, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1217 [hereinafter Military Technical Agreement]. The MTA
followed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to withdraw its troops
from Kosovo. Behrami, 46 I.L.M. at 754. In response to this agreement, The
Republic of Serbia agreed to suspend air operations against the FRY. Id.
34. Military Technical Agreement, supra note 33, at 1217. The MTA provided
for the phased withdrawal of FRY forces and the deployment of an international
security and peacekeeping presence. Behrami, 46 I.L.M. at 754.
35. Military Technical Agreement, supra note 33, at 1217. Although the MTA
states that the international and security presence is under UN auspices, the
document is recognized as an agreement between KFOR and the FRY and The
Republic of Serbia. NATO is also a signatory. Behrami, 46 I.L.M. at 754.
36. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). The UN found
the power to adopt a resolution requiring security presence in a sovereign country
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Resolution also requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with
the Security Council, to appoint a special representative to control the
implementation of the international civil presence (UNMIK) and to
coordinate closely with the international security presence (KFOR),
in order to ensure that both presences ―operate towards the same
goals and in a mutually supportive manner.‖37 It further determined
the responsibilities of KFOR, including ensuring public safety and
supervising demining efforts when UNMIK can appropriately take
over responsibility for the task.38 UNMIK’s responsibilities, set forth
in the Resolution, consist of performing basic civilian administrative
functions for as long as required.39 The Resolution requests the
Secretary-General to relay reports from the leadership of the
international civil and security presences to the UNSC.40
Additional responsibilities of KFOR and UNMIK were
determined in various documents that followed the 1244 Resolution.
Regulation 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of
KFOR and UNMIK and their Personnel in Kosovo passed on August
18, 2000.41 The regulation, in section 2, provided that KFOR was
immune from jurisdiction before courts in Kosovo. Such personnel
would be immune from arrest or detention from any State or
organization not acting on behalf of the individual’s sending State.42
The individual was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of his or her
under Chapter 1 and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 1–2, 39–51.
Chapter 1, article 1, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter states that the primary objective
of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. Id. art. 1, para. 1. Chapter
7, Article 39 grants the UN the ability to determine the existence of any threat to
international peace and make recommendations in accordance with Article 41 and
42 of the Charter. Id. art. 39. Article 42 states that when the measures provided for
in Article 41 (economic sanctions and diplomatic relations) are inadequate, the UN
has the power to take action by force as may be necessary to maintain or restore the
goals provided in Chapter 1 (international peace and security). Id. art. 42.
37. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 36, ¶ 6.
38. Id. ¶ 9.
39. Id. ¶ 11.
40. Id. ¶ 20. In addition to the main language of the Resolution, there are two
Annexes. Annex 1 discusses the general principles regarding a political solution to
the crisis in Kosovo, and Annex 2 puts forth general principles of the mission,
including that the ―international security presence with substantial [NATO]
participation must be deployed under unified command and control.‖ Id. annexes
1–2.
41. UNMIK, On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK
and Their Personnel in Kosovo, Reg. No. 2000/47, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (Aug. 18, 2000).
42. Id. §§ 2.3–2.4.
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member-state.43 Further, UNMIK personnel were immune from legal
process in respect to actions—verbal or physical—taken in their
official capacity.44
The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission) described the limited power the UN had over KFOR
troops.45 The Venice Commission stated that ―KFOR, unlike
UNMIK, is not a UN peacekeeping mission.‖46 KFOR is not a
subsidiary organ of the United Nations even though it derives its
mandate from UNSC Resolution 1244.47 Accordingly, the actions of
KFOR, even possible human rights violations, are not attributable to
the UN because KFOR is not an international legal person.48
The only control the UN had over KFOR brigades was ―unified
command and control.‖49 Unified command and control is a military
term that encompasses only a limited form of the transfer of power
over troops.50 Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) have not
transferred to the UN full control over their troops.51 The structure
was such that the NATO commander, acting through the UN
mandate, gave operational commands to the commander of the
respective national unit but not to an individual soldier.52 This system
allowed TCNs to preserve the power to withdraw their soldiers at any
moment.53 The reasoning behind such a military scheme is to ensure
that TCNs retain political responsibility and control over their
soldiers, while remaining compatible with the obligations of the
military effort.54

43. Id. § 2.4(a).
44. Id. § 2.3. The Secretary-General holds the right to waive immunity of
UNMIK personnel in order to preserve justice. Id. § 6.1. The respective state’s
commander, however, retains the right to waive jurisdiction over KFOR personnel.
Id. § 6.2.
45. European Comm’n for Democracy through Law (Venice Comm’n), Opinion
on Human Rights in Kosovo, Opinion No. 280/2004, ¶ 14, CDL-AD (2004)003
(Oct. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Venice Comm’n].
46. Id. ¶ 79.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. ¶ 14.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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The responsibilities regarding demining stem from various
documents detailing the measures taken by the international effort to
ensure safety in Kosovo. On June 12, 1999, the Secretary-General
outlined the structure of UNMIK in a speech to the UNSC.55 UNMIK
was responsible for creating the United Nations Mine Action
Coordination Centre (UNMACC), the primary UN organization
charged with demining operations in Kosovo.56 UNMACC was
designed to plan mine action activities and to coordinate between
KFOR, UN agencies, and international organizations.57
On August 24, 1999, UNMIK assumed responsibility for
humanitarian mine action in Kosovo.58 Five days later, however,
KFOR announced that it remained highly involved in the demining
efforts.59 According to this directive, MNBs were to conduct
demining tasks in accordance with a priority list provided by UNMIK
and UNMACC.60 KFOR conducted mission essential mine clearance,
and although UNMACC assumed de facto responsibility for
demining, this assumption of responsibility did not relieve KFOR of
its own responsibility to support the demining mission (specifically to
identify, mark, and report CBU locations).61
B. Test to Determine Attribution of an Organization’s Actions
Although there is no binding law explaining when actions of an
international organization are attributable to the State, there is a near
consensus on how to approach the problem in the academic
community.62 The International Law Commission (ILC) has
discussed this precise issue at considerable length, especially in its
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations.63
55. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), U.N. Doc.
S/1999/672 (June 12, 1999).
56. Id. ¶ 12.
57. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the U.N. Interim
Admin. Mission in Kosovo, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779 (July 12, 1999).
58. Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 758 (2007).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 758–59.
62. See generally Marko Milanović & Tatjana Papić, As Bad as it Gets: The
European Court of Human Rights’s Behrami and Saramati Decision and General
International Law, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 267 (2009).
63. See generally Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 59th Sess., May 7–June 5, July
9–Aug. 10, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/62/10; GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2007)
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Article 5 of the draft articles proposes a test that puts forth a method
of determining whether a State or an international organization is
responsible for actions that occurred during a mission orchestrated by
the international organization. The test put forth in draft article 5 is:
―the conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an
international organization that is placed at the disposal of another
international organization shall be considered under international law
an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective
control over the conduct.‖64
Commentary in draft article 5 is provided to help define effective
control. Draft article 5 describes effective control as ―factual control
that is exercised over the specific conduct taken by the organ or agent
placed at the receiving organization’s disposal.‖65 ―Attribution of
conduct to the contributing State is clearly linked with the retention
of some powers by that State over its national contingent.‖66 The
degree of control the State possesses over its troops is, therefore, the
relevant factor in determining whether troop misconduct is
attributable to the State.67
The ILC in draft article 7 of the Responsibility of International
Organizations puts forth the notion that more than one State or
international organization can retain effective control over the troops.
The commentary for article 7 provides that although dual attribution
may not occur often in practice, ―attribution of a certain conduct to an
international organization does not imply that the same conduct
cannot be attributed to a State, nor does vice versa attribution of
conduct to a State rule out attribution of the same conduct to an
international organization.‖68
[hereinafter 2007 ILC Report]. The ILC’s ability to interpret international law
comes from the United Nations Charter, Article 13(1)(a) and U.N. Resolution 174.
―The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of . . . encouraging the progressive development of international law.‖
U.N. Charter art. 13(1). Resolution 174 established the International Law
Commission. G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 21, 1947).
64. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 63, drft. art. 5 (emphasis added). The most
recent revision of the draft articles renumbers draft article 5 as draft article 6.
Compare id., with Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st Sess., May 4–June 5, July
6–Aug. 7, 2009, drft. art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/64/10, 21; GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No.
10 (2009).
65. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 63, drft. art. 5 cmt. 3.
66. Id. drft. art. 5 cmt. 6.
67. Id. drft. art. 5 cmt. 7.
68. Id. drft. art. 7 cmt. 4.
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Although the international community overwhelmingly believes
that the issue of State responsibility should be determined by whether
the actions are attributable to the State, the European Court of
Human Rights and a minority of international scholars believe that
the question should be whether the power was delegated to the State.
Danesh Sarooshi, in his book The United Nations and the
Development of Collective Security, asserts that the ―delegation must
be sufficiently limited . . . for the acts of the delegate entity to be
attributable to the UN.‖69 His writings put forth a new test that
analyzed whether the international organization or the State exercised
―overall authority and control over the forces.‖70
Sarooshi’s book asserts that the foundation for this rule can be
found in article 5 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (State Responsibility).71
Draft article 5 of State Responsibility purports that ―conduct of an
entity. . . [that] is empowered by the law of that State to exercise
elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of
the State under international law.‖72 According to Sarooshi, article 5,
when applied to the context of international organizations and troop
misconduct, renders an organization responsible even when it
delegates some of the powers in question to a State.73 He further
argues that for a delegation to be lawful, the UN must at all times
69. Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 770 (2007).
70. DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS
CHAPTER VII POWERS 163 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1999); see also Alexander
Breitegger, Sacrificing the Effectiveness of the European Convention on Human
Rights on the Altar of the Effective Functioning of Peace Support Operations: A
Critique of Behrami & Saramati and Al Jedda, 11 INT’L CMTY. L.R. 155, 169
(2009). This test was proposed prior to draft article 5. 2007 ILC Report, supra note
63, drft. art. 5.
71. SAROOSHI, supra note 70, at 164 n.85. Sarooshi finds foundation for his
argument in then article 7(2) of the ILC draft article, which is now known as draft
article 5. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 284 n.69.
72. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int’l Law
Comm’n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, drft. art. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (July 26, 2001) [hereinafter Responsibility of States].
73. See SAROOSHI, supra note 70, at 165.
The acts of forces authorized by the Council are attributable to the UN,
since the forces are acting under UN authority. . . . The importance of this
position is that it iterates the fact that the forces are carrying out military
enforcement action of an international nature under the overall control of
the Council.
Id. See also Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 284.
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retain ―overall authority and control‖ over the exercise of the
delegated powers.74 This, Sarooshi claims, is the foundation for his
delegation theory.
IV. THE COURT’S REASONING
The Court puts forth a control test to determine whether France
or the UN was responsible for the demining mission.75 The Court’s
test is ―whether the UNSC retained ultimate authority and control so
that operational command only was delegated.‖76 In order for the UN
to retain ―ultimate authority and control,‖ the delegation of UNSC
powers to France ―must be sufficiently limited.‖77 If the delegation of
UN powers to France was sufficiently limited, then the UN was
responsible for failing to demine and thus liable for Behrami’s
death.78 In determining that the UN possessed ultimate authority and
control over the mission, the Court concluded that the UN held the
mandate to demine and the troop’s inaction was attributable to the
UN.79
A. Which Entity held the Mandate to Demine?
Article 9(e) of UNSC Resolution 1244 stated that KFOR
retained responsibility for leading the demining mission until
UNMIK established a UN demining organization to take over.80 Such
an organization (UNMACC) was established by October 1999,81 well
before the detonation in question in this case. The Court reasoned that
after the transfer of power, KFOR remained involved in demining
projects; however, its actions were no longer independent but rather
were taken on behalf of UNMIK.82

74. SAROOSHI, supra note 70, at 34 (―[T]he Council must at all times retain
overall authority and control over the exercise of delegated Chapter VII powers‖);
Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The
‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 509, 521 (2008).
75. Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 770 (2007).
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing SAROOSHI, supra note 70).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 768–69.
80. Id. at 769.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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B. Could the Impugned Inaction Be Attributed to the UN?
UNSC Resolution 1244 granted the UN the ability to establish
and command an international security presence.83 Acting pursuant to
this power, the Court believed the UN delegated its authority to
participating member-states.84 Actions of member-states are
attributable to the UN only if the UN did not release—but only
delegated—its powers to the participating States.85 Even though
KFOR did not properly assist UNMIK with the demining efforts86
when it both failed to secure the site and provide vital information to
UNMIK regarding which territories needed to be demined, 87 the
Court determined that this misconduct was attributable to the UN
because the UN merely delegated its powers, leaving UNMIK in
ultimate control of the mission.88
The Court argued that the UN created a chain of command that
provided KFOR with control over the member-states, while
remaining subservient to the UN.89 At the bottom of the chain are
MNBs, who are commanded by lead officers from a TCN, such as
France.90 NATO devised an operational plan, which allowed it to
directly command the TCN through KFOR. The UN intended that
NATO’s command of operational matters would be effective and not
exclusive. The Court reasoned that since this operational plan was not
exclusive, the UN possessed ultimate control.91 The Court further
argued that TCN involvement was not incompatible with NATO
possessing effective operational control.92 The Court concluded that
the UN retained ultimate authority since only effective command was
delegated and thus, any inaction regarding demining was attributable
to the UN.93

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id.
Id. at 771.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 772.
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V. ANALYSIS
In Behrami v. France, the European Court of Human Rights held
that the failure to demine certain areas in Kosovo was attributable to
the UN and not France because the UN retained ultimate authority
and control over the demining regulation.94 In so holding, the Court
improperly conflated two distinct legal theories in international law,
resulting in a new test for international attribution that departed from
the standard established by leading international scholars and created
a negative impact on public policy. Had the Court applied the test
that the overwhelming majority of international scholars support, the
Court would have concluded that the failure to demine was
attributable to France and not the UN. Further, had the Court adopted
the correct test for this situation, the Court would have been given the
opportunity to find that the actions were attributable to all the actors
(NATO, UN, and France) under the theory of dual or multiple
attribution. By adopting a test that does not have roots in international
attribution, the Court not only created for itself a backlash against its
ability to handle such cases, it also scarred its reputation as a fair and
unprejudiced arbitrator.
A. Delegation Theory Does Not Apply to Situations of
International Responsibility
The foundation of the Court’s improper holding lies in the
phrasing of the issue. The Court framed the issue as whether the
Security Council retained ―ultimate authority and control‖ over the
international security presence as was necessary to render the
delegation of its powers lawful under the UN Charter.95 In order to
determine what constituted the necessary international security
presence to render its powers delegated, the Court put forth its own
test. The Court stated that ―any delegation of authority by the
[Security] Council must be sufficiently limited to assure that the acts
of the delegated entity are attributable to the United Nations.‖96 The
root of the Court’s illogical reasoning stems from this test.97 The
94. Id. at 769–73.
95. Aurel Sari, Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support
Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 164
(2008) (citing Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 771 (2007)).
96. Pierre Bodeau-Livinec et al., International Decisions: Behrami & Behrami
v. France; Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 323, 328
(2008).
97. Sari, supra note 95.

SADIA

284

12/3/2011 11:18 PM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 26:271

notion of ―ultimate authority and control‖ and ―delegation‖ is not a
theory the Court adopted based on precedent or international law.98 It
is language taken from one piece of academic literature that focuses
on the delegation of power rather than the attribution of
responsibility.99
By adopting this test, the Court conflated two leading principles
of international law: attribution and delegation. The central issue of
this case deals with attributing the acts of a nation-state to an
international organization—the United Nations. The issue of whether
the United Nations sufficiently rendered their delegable powers to the
State should never have been considered. The Court’s decision to use
the delegation test rather than the internationally accepted attribution
test stemmed from Danesh Sarooshi’s book on collective security.100
Sarooshi relies upon draft article 5 of State Responsibility, which
states that ―conduct of an entity . . . [that] is empowered by the law of
that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be
considered an act of the State under international law.‖101 From this
language, Sarooshi reasons that the ―delegation must be sufficiently
limited. . .for the acts of the delegate entity to be attributable to the
United Nations.‖102 Accordingly, Sarooshi concludes that the
appropriate test is whether the international organization or the State
exercised ―overall authority and control over the acts of the
forces.‖103
This test does not stem from ILC’s Draft Articles of
International Responsibility nor does it find support in the Court’s
jurisprudence.104 The Court simply assumes that Sarooshi’s
delegation model is the proper way of approaching the issue of
98. See generally Breitegger, supra note 70; Heike Krieger, A Credibility Gap:
The Behrami and Saramati Decision of the European Court of Human Rights, 13 J.
INT’L PEACEKEEPING 159 (2009); Christopher Leck, International Responsibility in
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Command and Control Arrangements
and the Attribution of Conduct, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 346 (2009); Bodeau-Livinec
et al., supra note 96; Milanović & Papić, supra note 62.
99. See sources cited supra note 98.
100. Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 770 (2007).
101. Responsibility of States, supra note 72.
102. Behrami, 46 I.L.M. at 770 (citing SAROOSHI, supra note 70, at 35 (―[T]he
council cannot delegate to Member-states an unrestricted power of command and
control. . . . [T]he Council must at all times retain overall authority and control over
the exercise of its delegated Chapter VII powers‖)).
103. SAROOSHI, supra note 70, at 165.
104. Krieger, supra note 98, at 167.

SADIA

12/3/2011 11:18 PM

2011]

BEHRAMI V. FRANCE

285

whether the UN or the States had authorization to demine in
Kosovo105 without first explaining why delegation was the proper test
or why the internationally supported attribution model should not
apply to this case.106
The critical problem with the Court’s adoption of Sarooshi’s
delegation theory is that Sarooshi ―thinks of international
organizations as if they were States.‖107 He believes that the same
rationale behind the Articles of State Responsibility can equally
apply to the responsibility of international organizations.108 Sarooshi
fails to address that it is the States who set up international
organizations and that it is through States that the international
organization may act.109 At no point does Sarooshi or the Court
explain why UN responsibility should be analyzed in the framework
of the delegation theory.110 Nor does Sarooshi provide an explanation
for why the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility should even
apply to the question of UN responsibility.111
Because the Court applied the wrong test, the Court reached a
troublesome conclusion. The Court held that Resolution 1244 was a
delegation of the Security Council’s powers to KFOR.112 The Court
concluded that any act KFOR performed pursuant to its delegated
powers is thus attributable to the UN.113 Instead, the Court should
have asked if the Security Council exercised effective control over
the troops so as to render the failure to demine attributable to the
UN.114 Had the Court applied the effective control test found in draft
article 5 of International Responsibility, the Court would have arrived
at the correct conclusion that the failure to demine was attributable to
France.
B. ILC Draft Articles and Its International Support
The crux of the Behrami case is the issue of attribution and
whether an international organization or the nation-state was
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 278.
Id. at 281–84.
Id. at 281.
Id.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281; 2007 ILC Report, supra note 63.
Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 769 (2007).
Id. at 773.
Sari, supra note 95.
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responsible for the failure to demine. Since the international rules of
responsibility govern the attribution of internationally wrongful
conduct to an international organization,115 the Court should have
applied the ILC’s effective control test.
Although the Articles on Responsibility of International
Organizations are only in the drafting phase, the ILC has
provisionally adopted the articles.116 Even though the articles are not
a definitive statement on international law, the ILC’s work on the
responsibility of international organizations is nonetheless a valuable
guide117 on how to approach the issue of attribution when dealing
with international organizations and nation-states. The draft articles
of international responsibility have already gained large support in
the international community; and a number of international and
national tribunals,118 such as the UN and the ICJ,119 have invoked
draft article 5.
Draft article 5 states that the conduct of a State placed at the
disposal of an international organization shall be considered under
international law an act of the international organization if the
international organization exercised effective control over the
conduct.120 Commentary in draft article 5 describes effective control
as factual control that is exercised over specific conduct.121
Attribution of misconduct to the State is clearly linked with the
State’s retention of some power over its national contingent.122
A presumption against the international organization is
incorporated into the ILC draft articles.123 As part of the ILC design,
there is a presumption that the misconduct of a UN peacekeeping
operation is attributable to the UN.124 The presumption may be
rebutted, provided that the international organization can prove, with
particular conduct, that the nation-state rather than the international
organization exercised effective control.125 In order to attribute
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 163.
Leck, supra note 98, at 348.
Sari, supra note 95, at 163.
Leck, supra note 98, at 346.
Id. at 348–49.
2007 ILC Report, supra note 63, drft. art. 5.
Id. drft. art. 5 cmt. 3.
Id. drft. art. 5 cmt. 6.
Breitegger, supra note 70, at 159.
Id.
Id.
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misconduct to a participating nation-state, the international
organization must provide specific instances of misconduct that
occurred while the State retained effective control over the troops.126
The State’s retention of power over its troops is the key to
determining attribution.127 If the misconduct was executed as a result
of instructions from the participating State, rather than the direction
and control of the international organization, the conduct will be
attributed to the State.128 Actions of the troops are not attributable to
the international organization so long as the participating troops
remain under the control of the nation-state, in respect to deployment
and conduct.129
C. Conflation of International Law Principles: Delegation and
Attribution
Not only did the Court fail to apply the appropriate ILC test with
respect to the attribution of the misconduct to the UN, the Court
applied the Sarooshi test incorrectly. The Court began its reasoning
of attribution by putting forth Sarooshi’s delegation method.130 The
Court then conflated the international theories of attribution and
delegation by applying the ILC effective control test to NATO in
order to conclude that the UN sufficiently delegated its authority.131
Had the Court began and ended its analysis on NATO’s effective
control, the Court would have correctly applied the appropriate test
and come to a reasonable conclusion.
In its reasoning, the Court states that in order to attribute the
troops demining misconduct to the UN, the UN must have ―ultimate
authority and control‖ over the demining mission so as to have

126. Leck, supra note 98, at 348 (―[T]he effective control test is not applied
generally to the overall conduct of the organ, but rather to each specific unlawful
act, in order to verify if the act in question of the organ was performed under the
control of the [international organization] or the sending state.‖) (quotations and
footnote omitted).
127. Id. (―If the unlawful act was executed on the instructions of the sending
state, the conduct should be attributed to the state. If carried out on the direction
and control of the [international organization], the act should be imputed to the
[international organization].‖) (footnote omitted).
128. Id.
129. Krieger, supra note 98, at 166.
130. Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 770 (2007).
131. See id. at 769–73.
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delegated limited authority to the troops.132 After discussing
Sarooshi’s theory of delegation in relation to the UN and the
demining mission, the Court concluded that the UN had ultimate
authority and control over the demining mission because NATO had
effective control over the troops.133 By analyzing both delegation and
attribution in order to determine that the UN was responsible for
demining, the Court unreasonably conflated the two theories. At no
time during the Court’s analysis did it explain how or why it
conflated the theories of delegation and attribution.134 The Court both
failed to explain on what grounds the conflation of international law
was justified and why NATO’s effective control was even relevant to
the UN’s attribution.
By conflating the theory of delegation and attribution, the Court
failed to comply with established international law and theory.135
Further, the Court’s reasoning was nonsensical because it determined
that NATO’s effective control of the troops was relevant in the
analysis of whether the UN retained ultimate authority and control
after delegating sufficiently limited power to the troops.136 It was the
UN’s—and not NATO’s—effective control that should have been
dispositive. By failing to explain this leap in reasoning, the Court’s
conclusion that the misconduct was attributable to the UN lost
significant credibility.137
D. Attribution of Demining Misconduct in International Law
Because the Court conflated leading legal theory and made
illogical jumps in reasoning without explanation or justification, the
conclusion that the demining misconduct is attributable to the UN is
incorrect. In order to determine whether the misconduct is
attributable to France, the UN, or NATO, one must apply the ILC
draft article effective control test, as it is the leading legal theory on
attribution in international law.
The Court concluded that the demining misconduct was not
attributable to France based on UN Resolution 1244, which

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 768–71
Id. at 772.
See generally id. at 769–73.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part V.D.
See infra Part V.F.
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authorized the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.138 Resolution 1244
stated that KFOR was responsible for the supervision of demining
until the UN civil presence, UNMIK, could take over.139 Because
KFOR is not an international legal person, demining misconduct
cannot be attributable to it under international law.140 The Court,
therefore, had the option of attributing the conduct to the UN, France,
or NATO. The Court concluded that at the time a land mine killed
Behrami in Kosovo, UNMIK had taken responsibility for demining
from KFOR.141
This conclusion is unjustified, as there was not convincing
evidence that, at the time in question, UNMIK had effective control
over the mandate to demine.142 Although UNMIK assumed
responsibility for the demining mission, KFOR announced that it
remained highly involved in the efforts.143 Because KFOR assumed
de facto responsibility for the demining mission,144 Resolution 1244’s
demining mandate to UNMIK is not dispositive, as the real question
for attribution is whether UNMIK had effective control over the
mission and not whether it had a mandate from the UN.
The ILC Report of 2004 states that actions of military forces
provided by nation-states are not attributable to the UN when the
UNSC authorizes States to take necessary measures outside UN chain
of command.145 Meaning that, in international law, an act committed
outside the chain of command is attributable to the State.146
―Command is the essence of effective control, and this is something
that the [UN] most certainly did not exercise in relation to KFOR‖
troops.147 The UN clearly distinguished between UNMIK and KFOR

138. See Behrami, 46 I.L.M. at 773.
139. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 36, ¶ 9(e).
140. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 287–88 (citing Venice Comm’n, supra
note 45, ¶ 79); see also Krieger, supra note 98, at 164 n.19.
141. Behrami, 46 I.L.M. at 772. The Court concluded that UNMIK had the
mandate to demine without further examination of the nature or content of the
obligation. Bodeau-Livinec et al., supra note 96, at 327.
142. Bodeau-Livinec et al., supra note 96.
143. Behrami, 46 I.L.M. at 758.
144. Id. at 758–59.
145. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 56th Sess., May 3–June 4, July 5–Aug. 6,
2004, drft. art. 5 cmt. 5, U.N. Doc. A/59/10, 102; GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp No. 10
(2004) [hereinafter 2004 ILC Report].
146. Sari, supra note 95, at 166.
147. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 286.
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and provided for separate control structures.148 The UN chose to
authorize member-states to deploy forces rather than to establish a
UN operation with UN troops.149 Requiring periodic submissions of
reports regarding demining activities was the only means by which
the UN exercised some control over KFOR.150 This, however, does
not equate to effective control because UNMIK was entirely
dependent upon the States’ troops for these submissions regarding the
sites of land mines in Kosovo.151
The fact that the demining conduct did not occur on a TCN’s
territory does not decisively rule out State attribution.152 The
contributing States’ retention of substantial powers over their troops
is evidence that the States had effective control over the demining
conduct.153 Troops fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of their
nation-state for civil and criminal matters. KFOR was immune from
UN detention and arrest, and only the States and not the individual
retained the right to waive this immunity.154 Additionally, each nation
established and followed individual rules of engagement.155
Deployment decisions and the financing of the troops were solely
national decisions,156 and soldiers wore national uniforms with their
national flags.157 Further, States were financially liable for damage
caused by the troops.158
Most importantly, KFOR troops were directly answerable to
their national commander.159 The soldiers were allowed to refuse to
148. Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 769–70 (2007); see also Krieger, supra
note 98, at 164.
149. Larsen, supra note 74, at 525.
150. Sari, supra note 95, at 165.
151. Breitegger, supra note 70, at 165–66 (―[I]n the absence of [information from
KFOR, UNMIK] . . . could not take any action to demine.‖).
152. Krieger, supra note 98, at 175.
153. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 286.
154. Id.
155. Id. Although KFOR had its own rules of engagement, each nation’s
interpretation of these rules varied. Breitegger, supra note 70, at 170–71. The
individual states examined NATO’s proposed rules of engagement and individually
determined whether the rules were in alignment with national standards. Krieger,
supra note 98, at 172.
156. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 286.
157. Krieger, supra note 98, at 172. The national flags were worn along with the
NATO flag. Id. at 173.
158. Id. at 173.
159. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 286.
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perform an order if it conflicted with the individual State’s national
objectives and interests.160 Although KFOR issued directives, the
troops only acted on their national commander’s specific orders.161 If
a human rights violation were to occur through KFOR actions, the
participating nation-states were undoubtedly in the position to
prevent or respond to such a violation.162 The nation-state could make
a national order preventing the troops from participating in such a
human rights violation. Such an extent of State power over the
competency of the soldiers constitutes a decisive degree of effective
control over the troops.163
E. Possibility of Dual Attribution
The Court failed to address the possibility that the demining
misconduct could be attributed to more than one actor.164 ILC draft
article 7 of the Responsibility of International Organizations put forth
the notion of dual attribution.165 Such a situation allows for the
possibility that more than one State and/or international organization
can retain effective control over troops in an international mission.166
The Court could have adopted the Venice Commission’s opinion
that demining, at least in part, may have been attributable to
NATO.167 The Venice Commission likely came to this conclusion
because ―unified command and control‖ was not placed with UN
commanders, but rather, it rested with NATO and national
officials.168 The chain of command used by the Court to establish
attribution to the UN in reality illustrates the possibility of NATO
effective control over the demining mission.169 The national
commanders were to take actions in accordance with a plan NATO

160. Breitegger, supra note 70, at 171 (noting that ―any troop contributing
country‖ could refuse to carry out a given order if it conflicted with national
objectives).
161. Krieger, supra note 98, at 170–71.
162. Larsen, supra note 74, at 520.
163. Id. at 173.
164. See Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 769–73 (2007).
165. 2007 ILC Report, supra note 63, drft. art. 7.
166. Id.
167. See Krieger, supra note 98, at 170.
168. See id. at 168.
169. Id.
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devised.170 The troops operated under the authority and were subject
to the political direction of the NATO chain of command.171 Even
though individual nations have their own rules of engagement, these
rules were subject to the approval of NATO.172 Although the national
leaders held effective control over the troops, NATO likely shared
effective control through the theory of dual attribution.
F. The Court’s Decision Has Deterred the Advancement of
International Human Rights Law
When the Court improperly conflated the principles of
delegation and attribution, it severely hampered the progression of
international human rights law, removed itself as an effective judicial
body in the protection of human rights, and damaged its reputation
within the international community.
1. Impeding the Progression of International Human
Rights Law
By carelessly conflating established international principles, the
Court damaged the legitimacy of the ILC’s draft articles on
international responsibility. The Court’s application of an
unsupported test complicated the progression and universal adoption
of the ILC draft articles.173 Because European national courts defer to
the European Court of Human Rights, other courts may adopt the
Court’s legally unfounded test.174 The Court’s decision prevents the
progression of international human rights law because now States can
have it both ways; States can retain effective control over their forces,
while simultaneously denying liability for the misconduct of their
170. Id. at 168–69 (quoting Behrami v. France, 46 I.L.M. 746, 771 (2007)
(―MNB action was to be taken according to an operational plan devised by NATO
and operated by . . . KFOR.‖)).
171. Id. at 168.
172. See id. at 172.
173. Sari, supra note 95, at 170.
174. Naina Patel, Al-Jedda v. SSD: Who is Responsible for British Troops
Abroad?, BLACKSTONE CHAMBERS (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.blackstone
chambers.com/document.rm?id=256. In Al-Jedda v. SSD, the House of Lords was
asked to determine whether the actions of British troops operating as a
multinational force in Iraq are attributable to the British government or to the UN.
Id. Since the European Court of Human Rights addressed this question in Behrami
v. France, the House of Lords adopted an analogous conclusion. Id. The Lordship’s
argument prior to the release of the Behrami decision refers to the ―effective
control‖ test. Id. However, the House of Lords eventually adopted Behrami’s
―ultimate authority and control‖ test. Id.
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troops because the Court determined that such actions are solely
attributable to the UN.175 Allocating responsibility to the UN, instead
of where responsibility actually lies, may encourage the troops to
participate in reckless conduct for which they will not bear
responsibility.176
2. European Court of Human Rights is now an Ineffective
Judicial Body in the Protection of Human Rights
In addition to preventing the progression of international human
rights law, the Court failed to protect the dignity of human rights in
international peacekeeping missions, a goal it was tasked to uphold.
Holding that States, even with effective control over their troops, are
not accountable for troop misconduct, the Court created a void in the
realm of human rights protection.177 In light of this decision, States
will no longer fear that they must answer to the European Court of
Human Rights for troop misconduct.178 The Court has sent a clear
message to States that they can escape punishment for human rights
violations so long as they shield themselves behind an illusion of
working under the control of an international organization.179 By
failing to attribute the misconduct to the States, the Court missed an
important opportunity to advance the protection of human rights.180
This case has established an unfortunate precedent in assigning
responsibility181 and created a ―legal black hole over which there is
no independent human rights supervision.‖182

175. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 289.
176. Leck, supra note 98, at 363.
177. Sari, supra note 95, at 166.
178. Stephanie Farrior, Introductory Note to Behrami and Behrami v. France and
Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, 46 I.L.M. 743, 744 (2007).
179. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 268.
180. Krieger, supra note 98, at 159.
181. Boudeau-Livinec et al., supra note 96, at 326 (―[T]he decision arguably
reflects a debatable interpretation‖ of the United Nations Charter and the ILC Draft
Articles); see also id. at 328 (―[T]he Court seems to base its reasoning on a
questionable assumption‖ that may have ―significant implications for the United
Nations and the fulfillment of its functions.‖); id. at 330 (―Notwithstanding the
potential drawbacks of such a judicial approach, the Court’s reasoning . . . has
already been adopted in a number of other judicial decisions.‖); Sari, supra note 95,
at 170 (―More importantly, Behrami . . . sets the wrong precedent for the protection
of human rights in peace support operations.‖).
182. Milanović & Papić, supra note 62, at 295. The Court has already used this
case to dismiss several allegations of human rights violations in Kosovo. Id.
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If States insist on retaining control over aspects of international
operations, then it is only logical for human rights responsibility to
follow.183 Individuals who have suffered because of misconduct
during a peacekeeping operation usually have only limited legal
options available to them. This case has now removed the European
Court of Human Rights as a valuable source for human rights
remedies.
3. Damage to the European Court of Human Rights’
Reputation
The Court, by holding that it would not attribute misconduct to
the States, removed itself as the likely forum to hear lawsuits
regarding international peacekeeping operations.184 It is no longer
realistic to believe that the European Court of Human Rights will
provide an effective remedy to individuals harmed by misconduct in
peacekeeping missions.185 It is not unreasonable for the international
community to expect an international judicial body to demonstrate
greater competence in applying the rules of international
responsibility.186 The Court’s decision to protect the States instead of
protecting the victims of human rights violations damages its
credibility.187 By carelessly manipulating the laws of international
responsibility to fit the Court’s agenda, the Court has, in effect,
rendered itself irrelevant in resolving international peacekeeping
disputes.188
VI. CONCLUSION
In holding that the death of an innocent child due to the failure to
demine was attributable to the UN and not to France, the Court
misinterpreted and inappropriately applied established international
law.189 This departure has impeded the development and universal
acceptance of the ILC’s draft articles of international responsibility,
portrayed the Court as a judiciary unwilling and unable to apply
183. Larsen, supra note 74, at 529.
184. Farrior, supra note 178.
185. Breitegger, supra note 70, at 157.
186. Sari, supra note 95, at 169.
187. See Krieger, supra note 98, at 161. This decision also harms the credibility
of future peacekeeping missions because participating states will not share in the
responsibility to uphold international law. Id.
188. Larsen, supra note 74, at 531.
189. See supra Part IV.C.
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international law in order to remedy blatant violations of human
rights, and tarnished the Court’s reputation as a champion of
protecting human rights.190

190. See supra Part IV.F.

